Thirteen large commercial vessels transited the Strait of Hormuz on October 4, down from 24 a week earlier and from a pre-war baseline Reuters put at about 125 ships a day, carrying roughly a fifth of the world’s daily crude and LNG supply, as NBC News reported. That is a traffic collapse of close to 90%. The oil itself did not fall nearly as far: Gulf exports excluding Iran recovered to more than 81% of their pre-war levels in September, Kpler data showed, as Al Jazeera reported, even as attacks on tankers in the strait hit their worst pace since the war with Iran began on February 28.
Two counting methods land, by coincidence, on the same number. Vortexa’s figures, reported by gcaptain, put September Gulf flows at 19.2 million barrels a day against a 23.6-million-bpd pre-war average — 81%. Kpler’s own September total, built from different vessel tracking, is 18.6 million bpd. The aggregate hides an uneven recovery: crude and condensate exports are back to 91% of their 16.3-million-bpd pre-war level, while refined fuels, including diesel and jet fuel, are stuck at 60% of a 7.3-million-bpd baseline — a shortfall that is turning up as near-record diesel and jet-fuel prices well outside the Gulf.
Saudi Arabia did almost all of the work behind the headline number: its crude and condensate shipments rose 4.2 million bpd between August and September, to 6.6 million bpd, more than offsetting declines elsewhere in the region, Kpler reported. None of this rerouting is free. Daily charter rates for tankers making the Hormuz run have risen to about $1.3 million, from $20,000–$50,000 before the war — a rise of 26 to 65 times — and crews are being paid four to six times normal wages for an actual transit, double pay for operating nearby, as tbsnews reported. Standard Chartered’s own measure, which tracks strait transits specifically rather than aggregate exports, puts Hormuz traffic at closer to 60% of its old level: the 81% figure is a story about alternate routes, not about the strait getting safer.
The attacks, meanwhile, are outrunning the rerouting. UK Maritime Trade Operations logged nine attacks in the Gulf and the strait in the first days of October alone, already half of the count for the whole of September, a month itself inflated by four assaults in its final 48 hours. The data agree Iran is hitting ships at the worst rate of the war; they disagree, politely, on how many ships are left to hit.
A counteroffensive, a week old
Thirteen hundred kilometres southwest, Yemen’s internationally recognised government opened a second front on the same chokepoint. The Presidential Leadership Council’s Rashad al-Alimi announced an offensive, named Dawn of Yemen, to retake ground lost to the Iran-aligned Houthis since a 2022 truce collapsed in July. Government forces backed by Saudi-led coalition air power say they retook the port of Mocha and cut the roads supplying Houthi positions in Dhubab district, as Al Jazeera reported. Coalition spokesman Major General Turki al-Maliki said 100 fighter jets are flying in support and that the coalition has secured “air protection” of Bab al-Mandeb. Al Jazeera said it has not independently verified the extent of the claimed gains, and the Houthis deny Mocha has fallen at all, dismissing the government’s account as “fabricated heroics.”

The Houthis answered with claimed strikes on Saudi airports, oil infrastructure and military sites; Saudi Arabia said three people were wounded in attacks on airports in its south. Whether government forces can hold what they say they’ve taken is a separate question from whether they took it at all: an earlier accounting of the campaign found that the same units now advancing toward Bab al-Mandeb had lost the strait to the Houthis in a single week in September — the arithmetic of an army fighting on several fronts with one reserve.
Three ships, two nights, no flag on the attacker
War reached the Black Sea by a different vector. A Turkish-owned cargo ship, the Royad Mammadov, caught fire and sank in Romania’s exclusive economic zone on October 5 after a drone strike; Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said two Russian drones hit the vessel and killed its captain, with 11 crew rescued by Romanian ships and helicopters and one still missing, as Ars Technica reported. Twenty-four hours later, 128 kilometres off Bulgaria’s coast near Byala, drones hit two more: the Togo-flagged Alfa Watan sank outright and the Palau-flagged Able caught fire before a Bulgarian ferry evacuated its 18 crew, two of them with serious injuries flown to a hospital in Varna. Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev called it “an unacceptable attack in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone” and “a blatant violation of international law and maritime law.”
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called the strikes “increasingly concerning” but said the circumstances were “still being established,” declining to name an attacker. Neither Sofia nor Bucharest has used the word “Russia” in public, as Euromaidan Press noted. Zelenskyy has: Ukraine’s navy said a joint investigation with Bulgaria’s found “a Russian combined attack using both sea and aerial drones,” while insisting Ukraine’s own forces were not operating in that stretch of water.

The chokepoint war’s overflow
A fourth front has no drones, only an empty terminal. Ukraine’s strikes on Russian refineries have cut domestic diesel output enough that Moscow has extended its diesel export ban, month by month, through October 31, according to The Diplomat. Tajikistan, which drew 91.1% of the 599,500 tonnes of petroleum products it imported in the first half of 2026 from Russia, duty-free, found its usual supply running short. In August it asked Iran for 2.55 million tonnes of crude and fuel a year — 2 million tonnes of crude oil, 300,000 tonnes of diesel, 150,000 tonnes of petrol and 100,000 tonnes of jet fuel, a volume that would require about 51,000 railway tank cars, the Times of Central Asia reported. Deliveries began in late August, Tajikistan’s energy ministry said, without disclosing how much has actually arrived against the request.
| From | To | How |
|---|---|---|
| Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries | Moscow extends diesel export ban, through Oct 31 | cuts output |
| Moscow extends diesel export ban, through Oct 31 | Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan short of fuel | no carve-out keeps up |
| Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan short of fuel | Iran ships crude and refined fuel | buy oil, fuel |
| Iran's own exports near zero under US blockade | Iran ships crude and refined fuel | still redirects barrels |
| Iran ships crude and refined fuel | US secondary-sanctions exposure, EO 13846 | exposes buyers to |
| Russian refineries eventually repaired | Iran ships crude and refined fuel | would undercut on price |
Kyrgyzstan is making the same move by a different route. On the margins of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in August, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian agreed in principle to a Kyrgyz proposal for a jointly built refinery, with Iran supplying the crude and the two countries splitting the output, according to Iran’s Tasnim news agency, as AKIpress reported. Kyrgyzstan is also funding a $25 million mini-refinery at Kochkor-Ata and had targeted August 2026 for finishing modernisation of its existing Junda refinery at Kara-Balta, as the Times of Central Asia reported — insurance against exactly the kind of Russian supply gap that has now arrived.
Iran’s new role as regional back-up supplier arrives at an odd moment for its own oil industry. Iranian crude and condensate loadings collapsed from roughly 2 million bpd in March to about 740,000 bpd in July and 220,000–255,000 bpd in August under the US naval blockade, Kpler and Vortexa estimated, as Al Jazeera reported; September loadings were reported near zero. Tehran is extending fuel lifelines to Dushanbe and Bishkek from an export base running at roughly a tenth of its pre-war rate, which is possible only because what Central Asia needs is a sliver of Iran’s domestic refining capacity, not its seaborne crude.
The arrangement has its own expiry date. Once Russian refineries are repaired, cheap, duty-free fuel returns to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan under their Eurasian Economic Union terms, against which Iranian barrels can’t compete on price or rail logistics, Al Jazeera’s reporting noted. Central Asian buyers also inherit sanctions exposure under US Executive Order 13846, which targets anyone transacting in Iranian petroleum. Four fronts, one underlying mechanism: insurance, inventory and alternate routes are being drawn down faster than they’re being refilled. October 31, when Moscow’s diesel ban next comes up for renewal, is the number to watch.

