---
title: "China’s 620 Warheads Make a Three-Way Nuclear Cap Unlikely, and Beijing Keeps Saying No"
description: "Trump, Xi and Putin meet Thursday with no treaty limiting any of them, and the deals within reach are far smaller than a warhead cap."
author: "rews special report"
published: 2026-11-14T04:55:58Z
modified: 2026-11-14T13:03:30Z
url: https://rews.cc/a/trump-xi-and-putin-to-hold-first-three-way-summit-with-no-nu-d13f16
language: en
type: special report
tags: ["trump", "xi", "putin", "nuclear", "iran", "world", "us"]
publisher: "Rews (https://rews.cc)"
---

# China’s 620 Warheads Make a Three-Way Nuclear Cap Unlikely, and Beijing Keeps Saying No

*Trump, Xi and Putin meet Thursday with no treaty limiting any of them, and the deals within reach are far smaller than a warhead cap.*

Special report · By rews special report · November 14, 2026 · https://rews.cc/a/trump-xi-and-putin-to-hold-first-three-way-summit-with-no-nu-d13f16

## In brief

- Trump, Xi and Putin meet in Shenzhen on Nov. 19, the first three-way meeting of U.S., Chinese and Russian leaders
- SIPRI counts about 620 Chinese warheads, 34 of them deployed, against about 5,042 for the U.S. and 5,420 for Russia
- New START expired Feb. 5 after Trump left Putin’s offer to keep its limits for a year without a formal reply
- China has refused three-way talks since 2019, saying the U.S. and Russia must cut their far larger arsenals first
- Negotiators reportedly moved toward limits on A.I. in nuclear command and control rather than warhead caps

Donald Trump, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin will meet in Shenzhen on Thursday. It is the first three-way meeting ever held by leaders of the United States, China and Russia, and the White House has already said it does not expect a nuclear deal.

Olivia Wales, a White House assistant press secretary, announced the session on Friday. It will take place on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, [as Al Jazeera reported](https://aljazeera.com/news/2026/11/14/trump-xi-and-putin-to-hold-first-three-way-summit-in-china). “The president has made it clear that, among other topics, he will discuss the reduction of nuclear weapons in the world,” Ms. Wales said, [according to RTÉ](https://rte.ie/news/world/2026/1114/1599193-trump-xi-putin/). A senior administration official who briefed reporters on condition of anonymity was blunter about the odds. “We do not expect to get to any kind of agreement,” the official said, and added that “it’s time for China to sort of step up, you know, to the adults’ table,” [Reuters reported](https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/world/2026-11-14-trump-to-raise-nuclear-arms-cuts-with-putin-xi-on-thursday-white-house-says/).

The three governments hold about 11,082 of the world’s estimated 12,187 warheads. Since Feb. 5, when New START expired, no treaty has limited any of them. The record of the past seven years gives a fairly plain answer to the question Mr. Trump is bringing to Shenzhen. A common ceiling on warheads is out of reach: China has about 620 against roughly 5,000 each for the other two, Beijing has turned down every invitation since 2019, and no treaty has ever verified a country’s total stockpile. Smaller limits are another matter. A freeze on missile launchers could be checked by satellite, and a pledge to keep humans in charge of launch decisions already has a precedent. Those limits, along with advance notice of missile tests, are what negotiators were reportedly working toward.

![Three navy chairs surround a red circular table divided into three sections, each holding a cream rocket, with two large rockets and one small rocket.](https://rews.cc/img/5e5c445087cfddeba755c1d0b90a5b17f2ee2b72.webp)

## The arithmetic

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s [Yearbook 2026](https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2026/increasing-focus-nuclear-weapons-amid-heightened-escalation-risks-new-sipri-yearbook-out-now), released June 8, put Russia’s inventory in January at about 5,420 warheads and the American inventory at about 5,042. Both figures include retired weapons waiting to be dismantled. China had about 620, up 20 from a year earlier. The Russian and American military stockpiles, at roughly 4,400 and 3,700, make up about 83 percent of the 9,745 warheads the institute counts as available for use.

The gap is wider for weapons ready to fire. The United States has about 1,770 deployed warheads, according to a Federation of American Scientists estimate [cited by the Congressional Research Service](https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12672.html). Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, who run the federation’s Nuclear Information Project, also compile SIPRI’s estimates. By SIPRI’s count China had about 34 warheads deployed in January, up from 24, and the other 586 in central storage. That is a ratio of more than 50 to one.

The American case rests on growth. The Pentagon’s annual report on China’s military, [released Dec. 23](https://media.defense.gov/2025/Dec/23/2003849070/-1/-1/1/ANNUAL-REPORT-TO-CONGRESS-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2025.PDF), said the stockpile “remained in the low 600s through 2024, reflecting a slower rate of production when compared to previous years.” It kept its projection of more than 1,000 warheads by 2030. Even at that number, China would have “several thousand warheads fewer” than either rival, Mr. Korda [wrote in January](https://fas.org/publication/the-pentagons-slimmed-down-2025-china-military-power-report/). SIPRI said China’s arsenal had grown faster than any other country’s for the third year running, and it posted the new estimate on the day of release.

> SIPRI estimates that 🇨🇳China now has around 620 nuclear warheads. China is expanding its nuclear arsenal faster than any other country and showcased several new nuclear systems during its 2025 military parade.
>
> — **SIPRI** @SIPRIorg on X · [June 8, 2026](https://x.com/SIPRIorg/status/2063950020768915932)

## From 224 warheads to 620

For most of the nuclear age, China’s arsenal barely changed. The global stockpile [peaked at about 70,300 warheads](https://fas.org/initiative/status-world-nuclear-forces/) in 1986, and China then had 224, according to federation data [compiled by Visual Capitalist](https://www.visualcapitalist.com/global-nuclear-warhead-stockpiles-1945-2024/). As late as 2020 the Pentagon still put the Chinese stockpile in “the low 200s.” Since 1986 the world total has fallen to 12,187, with nearly all of the cuts made in Washington and Moscow. China’s count roughly tripled in six years.

Mr. Trump first pushed to bring China into a treaty in 2019, as New START approached its original 2021 expiration. On June 22, 2020, his special envoy for arms control, Marshall Billingslea, opened talks in Vienna with Sergei Ryabkov, Russia’s deputy foreign minister. He posted a photograph of Chinese flags set out before empty seats and wrote, “China is a no-show.” Beijing had declined the invitation two weeks earlier, [Al Jazeera reported](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/6/22/russia-us-hold-arms-control-talks-as-key-pacts-expiry-looms).

Elena Chernenko, who covers arms control for the Moscow newspaper Kommersant, reported soon afterward that the photo had been set up for the camera. She wrote that the Russian delegation had objected to the flags:

> This is not a real photo from the talks: as Kommersant learned the Russian delegation objected to Chinese flags in the absence of Chinese, so the US made this pic and then removed ALL flags before the meeting started
>
> — **Elena Chernenko** @ElenaChernenko on X · [June 22, 2020](https://x.com/ElenaChernenko/status/1275000790332125184)

On July 8, 2020, Fu Cong, then head of the arms control department at China’s foreign ministry, set out the terms Beijing has held to ever since. “If the U.S. says that they are ready to come down to the Chinese level, China would be happy to participate the next day,” he told reporters, [Reuters reported](https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2020/07/09/2003739640). “But actually, we know that’s not going to happen.” He called the American invitation a ploy to divert attention from Washington’s wish to walk away from New START.

The Biden administration [extended the treaty for five years](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/3/us-extends-strategic-nuclear-arms-treaty-with-russia) in February 2021, without China. It got one round of formal arms talks with Beijing, held in Washington on Nov. 6, 2023, the first since 2019. Eight months later China called off the next round because of American arms sales to Taiwan. “The responsibility fully lies with the U.S.,” said Lin Jian, a foreign ministry spokesman, [Al Jazeera reported](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/18/china-halts-nuclear-arms-talks-with-us-over-taiwan-support).

The only joint commitment from that period was a single sentence. When Joe Biden and Mr. Xi met in Lima on Nov. 16, 2024, the two leaders “affirmed the need to maintain human control over the decision to use nuclear weapons,” the White House said, [NPR reported](https://www.npr.org/2024/11/16/nx-s1-5193893/xi-trump-biden-ai-export-controls-tariffs). It came with no treaty, no inspections and no way to check compliance.

![A cream-colored mechanical hand arches over a large red button on a dark blue base against a teal background.](https://rews.cc/img/339e15771dcc0fbe14dc9bfa58973cc08e04082c.webp)

## A year without limits

In his second term Mr. Trump came back to the idea as a way to save money. Speaking in the Oval Office on Feb. 13, 2025, he said he wanted to tell Mr. Xi and Mr. Putin, “Let’s cut our military budget in half,” [VOA reported](https://www.voanews.com/a/trump-wants-denuclearization-talks-with-russia-china-hopes-for-defense-spending-cuts/7974285.html). On Sept. 22 that year Mr. Putin [offered](https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/putin-offers-trump-temporary-nuclear-120334568.html) to keep observing New START’s central limits for a year after it expired, provided Washington did the same. The limits were 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, 700 deployed missiles and bombers, and 800 launchers in all. Mr. Trump called the offer a “good idea” but never formally answered it, [Arms Control Today reported](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2026-03/news/new-start-expires-us-urges-modernized-treaty).

When the treaty lapsed, Mr. Trump wrote that rather than extend it, “we should have our Nuclear Experts work on a new, improved, and modernized Treaty that can last long into the future.” Secretary of State Marco Rubio made the case for a three-way format in an [essay published the next day](https://diplomatmagazine.eu/2026/02/09/the-next-era-of-nuclear-arms-control/):

> China’s rapid and opaque expansion of its nuclear arsenal since New START entered into force has rendered past models of arms control, based upon bilateral agreements between the United States and Russia, obsolete.
>
> — Marco Rubio, U.S. secretary of state, [diplomatmagazine.eu](https://diplomatmagazine.eu/2026/02/09/the-next-era-of-nuclear-arms-control/)

The same day in Geneva, Thomas DiNanno, the under secretary of state for arms control and international security, set out Washington’s priorities. They were “taking into account all Russian nuclear weapons, both novel and existing strategic systems” and “addressing the breakout growth of Chinese nuclear weapons stockpiles.” China’s ambassador, Shen Jian, replied that “China will not take part in nuclear disarmament negotiations at this stage” and called the United States the “culprit” behind the arms race.

The American position also left room for a deal without China. A month before the treaty expired, Mr. Trump told The New York Times that Chinese participation would be appropriate, but added, “I would do a deal with Russia without the Chinese.” No deal with Russia has followed.

## What a treaty would count

Christopher Yeaw, the assistant secretary of state for arms control and nonproliferation, described what Washington wants a new agreement to cover at a Hudson Institute event on Feb. 17, [according to the institute’s transcript](https://www.hudson.org/events/assistant-secretary-state-christopher-yeaw-end-new-start-treaty).

> Imagine a matrix where you have three columns, United States, Russia, China. ... only two blocks out of six were captured by the treaty. That’s a problem.
>
> — Christopher Yeaw, U.S. assistant secretary of state for arms control and nonproliferation, [hudson.org](https://www.hudson.org/events/assistant-secretary-state-christopher-yeaw-end-new-start-treaty)

The two blocks New START covered were American and Russian long-range forces, and only the deployed part of them. The treaty counted warheads on deployed missiles and counted each heavy bomber as one warhead, however many it could carry. That is how the United States can field about 1,770 warheads under a 1,550 cap. Stored warheads, theater weapons and all of China’s weapons were outside it. Mr. DiNanno called Russia’s lead in shorter-range nuclear weapons, which Mr. Kristensen [puts at 1,000 to 2,000 warheads](https://x.com/nukestrat/status/2039386858178666559), an “intolerable disadvantage.”

Filling in the other four blocks means choices none of the three has accepted, [as Open Magazine set out](https://openthemagazine.com/world/trump-putin-and-xi-control-11000-nuclear-warheads-can-they-build-new-guardrails). An equal ceiling for all three would invite China to build up to it. Proportional cuts would lock in China’s inferiority, which Beijing rejects. Beijing’s preference, a U.S.-Russian deal first, would leave China’s growth outside any limit, which Washington rejects. Moscow has a condition of its own. Mr. Ryabkov has [insisted](https://en.iz.ru/en/1992849/2025-11-19/russian-foreign-ministry-called-britain-and-france-be-taken-account-dialogue-strategic-stability) that any dialogue take British and French forces into account. Britain’s ambassador in Geneva, David Riley, replied in February that talks should center on “those states with the largest nuclear arsenals,” which he named as China, Russia and the United States, [Agence France-Presse reported](https://www.cp24.com/news/world/2026/02/06/us-says-new-nuclear-deal-should-include-china-accuses-beijing-of-secret-tests/).

Launchers are the one measure on which the three are close. China has an estimated 550 strategic launchers, [AFP reported](https://www.malaymail.com/amp/news/world/2026/02/05/china-says-it-will-not-join-nuclear-talks-at-this-stage/208155), against New START’s ceiling of 800 each for the other two. In October, Daryl G. Kimball of the Arms Control Association [proposed](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2026-10/focus/trump-xi-putin-failing-tackle-nuclear-threat) an indefinite freeze at current levels: fewer than 800 each for Russia and the United States, about 550 for China and about 96 combined for France and Britain. He wrote that the freeze “could be confidently verified through national means of intelligence.” Silos and submarines are hard to hide. Warheads are easy to hide.

![A satellite projects a turquoise beam onto a large icy cube with four dark oval openings partially covered by pale yellow discs against a blue background.](https://rews.cc/img/5117deb0d16bf62d2113048d704d909e57eaab8a.webp)

Without a freeze, there is a lot of room to grow. Pavel Podvig, who runs the Russian Forces project, [wrote in January](https://russianforces.org/blog/2026/01/life_after_new_start.shtml) that American “upload potential” would allow the number of deployed warheads to rise from the New START level of 1,550 “to about 3500.” Mr. Kristensen and his colleagues [estimated in May](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2026.2659527) that Russia could in theory add hundreds of warheads, increasing its deployed force by up to 60 percent. At Hudson, Dr. Yeaw listed the American options: “From uploading ICBMs to reconverting heavy bombers, to opening up SSBN tubes, et cetera.” Then he said, “All those decisions are yet to be made.”

## The verification problem

New START’s limits came with inspections, notifications and data exchanges, which let each side check the other’s numbers. Russia stopped allowing inspections in August 2022 and suspended its participation in February 2023, so for its last three years the treaty depended mostly on trust. A three-way deal on total warheads would need far more than the old system offered.

Steven Pifer of Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute [wrote in 2020](https://fsi.stanford.edu/node/21052) that verifying every warhead would prove “far more intrusive than anything” the two sides had accepted. It would probably require monitoring at storage sites, and he described those sites this way:

> These are among the most sensitive facilities that either side has.
>
> — Steven Pifer, Freeman Spogli Institute, Stanford University, [fsi.stanford.edu](https://fsi.stanford.edu/node/21052)

No treaty has done it. Past U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Russian agreements verified the destruction of delivery vehicles, not of warheads, because inspecting a warhead risks revealing its design, according to a [2026 paper on warhead verification](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2605.21505) posted to arXiv. The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, a group of more than 25 countries, is still developing the tools.

China also argues that openness is itself a danger. Tong Zhao, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, [wrote in 2020](https://carnegieendowment.org/china/posts/2020/08/modernizing-without-destabilizing-chinas-nuclear-posture-in-a-new-era) that Beijing fears more transparency could threaten the survivability of its small arsenal. Its disclosures are “mostly oriented toward delivering deterrence signals rather than providing strategic reassurance,” he told [Newsweek](https://www.newsweek.com/chinas-2026-nuclear-plans-11258248). Some checking would not need a treaty. “But data exchanges are doable without a treaty,” Mr. Podvig wrote, while on-site inspections “require a formal treaty.”

Testing is now part of the dispute. On Feb. 6, Mr. DiNanno accused China of carrying out a nuclear explosive test on June 22, 2020, and of “preparing for tests with designated yields in the hundreds of tonnes.” Mr. Shen called the remarks irresponsible. Specialists have questioned the charge on technical grounds, [Asia Times reported](https://asiatimes.com/2026/09/us-challenges-china-on-secret-nuclear-tests-as-arms-race-looms/), and it could not be independently verified. A U.S. delegation led by Dr. Yeaw raised it with Chinese officials this year at meetings of the five recognized nuclear powers, [Arms Control Today reported](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2026-10/news/white-house-renews-call-trilateral-arms-control-talks).

## Why Beijing says no

On Oct. 16, a reporter from the German news agency DPA asked about Mr. Trump’s statement that Washington was holding denuclearization talks with Russia and China. Mao Ning, a Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman, did not confirm that any talks were taking place. [Her answer](https://sl.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/fyrth/202610/t20261016_12041993.htm):

> China’s nuclear strength is by no means at the same level with that of the U.S. and Russia. It is neither fair, reasonable nor realistic to ask China to join the so-called trilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations at this stage.
>
> — Mao Ning, spokeswoman for China’s foreign ministry, [sl.china-embassy.gov.cn](https://sl.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/fyrth/202610/t20261016_12041993.htm)

The numbers are Beijing’s stated reason, but not its only one. In a [2024 study](https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/07/china-nuclear-buildup-political-drivers-united-states-relationship-international-security), Dr. Zhao traced China’s long avoidance of formal nuclear talks to “concerns about sharing sensitive information or being taken advantage of by a more powerful nuclear rival.” He found that Chinese officials increasingly treat a broader political settlement with Washington as a precondition. The 2024 suspension over Taiwan arms sales followed that logic. So did this year’s summits. After Mr. Xi’s White House visit on Sept. 24, the White House said Mr. Trump had “advocated for trilateral arms control negotiations.” China’s summary of the meeting did not mention arms control.

Tianjiao Jiang, an associate professor at Fudan University’s Development Institute, [wrote in Arms Control Today](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2026-07/features/how-can-us-engage-china-arms-control-chinese-perspective) in July that Beijing’s central demand is recognition that each side can destroy the other. American missile defense threatens that recognition, the article argued. In Beijing’s view, the Golden Dome plan, which SIPRI says is estimated to cost $1.2 trillion, and SpaceX’s Starlink network could become space weapons.

> China views acknowledging the mutual vulnerability between Beijing and Washington as the primary concern.
>
> — Tianjiao Jiang, associate professor, Development Institute, Fudan University, [armscontrol.org](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2026-07/features/how-can-us-engage-china-arms-control-chinese-perspective)

Beijing’s counteroffer has not changed. A [white paper issued Nov. 27, 2025](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zy/wjzc/202511/t20251127_11761656.html), China’s first on arms control in 20 years, again proposed that the five recognized nuclear powers agree, by treaty or by political statement, never to use nuclear weapons first. China first put the idea in a draft treaty in 1994, and the other four have never taken it up.

[![China says it will not join nuclear talks 'at this stage' | AFP](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/JA96oarVlvI/hqdefault.jpg)](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JA96oarVlvI)

Agence France-Presse report on China’s Feb. 5 statement, after New START expired, that it would not join nuclear disarmament talks at this stage. Video: AFP News Agency · YouTube

## Weighing the claims

Washington calls China’s growth a breakout. The Pentagon’s own report describes slower warhead production through 2024, and SIPRI recorded an increase of only 20 last year. The construction is real. The Pentagon says China has likely loaded more than 100 silos with DF-31-class missiles, although the federation has not yet confirmed this from satellite imagery. A congressional commission [predicted in 2023](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12621) that China would reach rough parity with the United States in deployed warheads by the mid-2030s. Dr. Zhao told Newsweek there was “still no convincing evidence that China has decided to pursue nuclear parity with the United States.” The record shows fast growth from a small base that has slowed over the past two years. It does not yet show a race to parity.

Beijing’s argument that the gap makes talks unfair holds up for warheads. China’s stockpile is about a sixth the size of America’s, and its deployed force about a fiftieth. The argument is weaker for launchers, where China’s roughly 550 are within 250 of the old American and Russian ceiling. And the demand that the two largest powers cut first ignores that they already have. Their combined arsenals fell from about 63,500 warheads in 1986 to about 8,100 in military stockpiles today, by SIPRI’s and the federation’s counts, while China’s nearly tripled. Meeting Mr. Fu’s 2020 condition of coming down to the Chinese level would mean cutting the American stockpile by another 83 percent.

The record gives some support to the charge that the American invitation is a ploy. In 2020, Mr. Billingslea linked any New START extension to progress on a three-way agreement that covered all warheads and included China. In 2026, Washington let the treaty lapse and cited China as the reason, and Mr. Trump’s January offer of a deal with Russia alone has produced nothing. The 2021 extension showed that U.S.-Russian limits could survive without Beijing.

The strongest skeptical case points the other way. Rebekah Koffler, a former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst, [argued in The Telegraph](https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/putin-xi-caught-trump-nuclear-200536164.html) in September 2025 that “China almost certainly will not sign any nuclear arms control deal, bilateral or trilateral,” and that “Putin has no leverage over Xi Jinping’s nuclear decision-making, either.” Nothing since has contradicted her first point. Beijing gave the same answer in October that it gave in 2020.

![Two tall red pencil rockets and one smaller matching rocket stand against a blue background beneath a blank cream rounded rectangle.](https://rews.cc/img/64fdfd988bdd64a18f7670fd40f7a520e21a930f.webp)

## What Shenzhen could produce

The agenda has narrowed to what Beijing might accept. American, Chinese and Russian representatives spent weeks negotiating it, and the talks increasingly centered on limiting artificial intelligence in nuclear command and control, [the South China Morning Post reported](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3374415/white-house-confirms-us-china-russia-trilateral-apec-sidelines), citing people familiar with the discussions. One source told the paper that Beijing had proposed discussing transparency instead of full negotiations on strategic stability. The leaders may also issue a joint statement that nuclear war is unacceptable.

A pledge on human control would expand on the Lima sentence and, like it, would come without inspections. A statement on nuclear war could matter more to Beijing than it seems. The Fudan article suggested that a leaders’ declaration that nuclear war cannot be won “can be seen as an indirect way of saying that the mutual vulnerability exists.”

The rest of the agenda is disputed. The senior U.S. official said Iran would come up and Ukraine would not, because “China is not really a part of that track,” a reference to the separate talks [held in Abu Dhabi on Nov. 10 and 11](https://rews.cc/a/in-abu-dhabi-three-delegations-talk-peace-while-europe-is-ke-08a20c). Yuri Ushakov, Mr. Putin’s foreign policy aide, said on Nov. 12 that Mr. Putin and Mr. Trump would keep discussing a Ukraine settlement in Shenzhen, [Kyiv Post reported](https://www.kyivpost.com/post/89960). The White House says no one-on-one meeting between the two is scheduled. Officials also said chip export controls and the resignation of Nvidia’s chief executive, Jensen Huang, [after an F.B.I. inquiry](https://rews.cc/a/trump-flies-to-shenzhen-as-nvidia-s-fallen-chief-becomes-a-q-95766a) would not come up.

More meetings follow soon. A U.S.-China dialogue on the risks and benefits of artificial intelligence, announced after the September summit, is scheduled for this month. Mr. Xi is expected at the Group of 20 summit in Miami in December, which would be his fourth meeting with Mr. Trump this year.

Until a new agreement exists, the only restraint on the two largest arsenals is the one Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, described to his parliament on Feb. 11. Russia will observe the expired treaty’s ceilings, he said, “only as long as the United States does not exceed the above limits.”

## See also

- [Chinese nuclear weapons, 2026 (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Nuclear Notebook)](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2026.2691662) — tandfonline.com · The federation's full open-source accounting of China's warheads, silos and launchers
- [Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States](https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Strategic-Posture-Committee-Report-Final.pdf) — fas.org · The 2023 report behind the two-nuclear-peer argument and calls for a larger U.S. force
- [The End of New START: From limits to looming risks](https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/the-end-of-new-start-from-limits-to-looming-risks/) — nti.org · Nuclear Threat Initiative analysis of what was lost when the treaty expired
- [Nukes Without Limits? A New Era After the End of New START](https://www.cfr.org/articles/nukes-without-limits-a-new-era-after-the-end-of-new-start) — cfr.org · Council on Foreign Relations assessment of upload risks after the expiry
- [China's Approach to Arms Control Verification (Sandia National Laboratories)](https://www.sandia.gov/app/uploads/sites/148/2022/04/SAND2022-3562-O.pdf) — sandia.gov · A technical study of how Chinese officials and experts think about verification
- [Nuclear Weapons Without Limits? Avoiding a New Arms Race After New START](https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Nuclear-Weapons-Without-Limits.pdf) — ucs.org · Union of Concerned Scientists report on upload capacity and bomber counting rules
- [China Signals Continuity in Nuclear Policy Paper](https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2025-12-11/china-signals-continuity-nuclear-policy-paper) — armscontrol.org · Arms Control Association reading of Beijing's 2025 arms control white paper
- [Conclusion of the 2026 NPT Review Conference](https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/05/conclusion-of-the-2026-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-review-conference) — state.gov · State Department statement after the May review conference ended without consensus

## Sources

- [Trump, Xi and Putin to hold first three-way summit in China](https://aljazeera.com/news/2026/11/14/trump-xi-and-putin-to-hold-first-three-way-summit-in-china) — aljazeera.com
- [Trump, Xi and Putin to meet in China next week](https://rte.ie/news/world/2026/1114/1599193-trump-xi-putin/) — rte.ie
