The U.S. Treasury on Oct. 1 designated A7, a Moscow payments network run by the fugitive Moldovan banker Ilan Shor, as a transnational criminal organization, after investigators found that its front companies abroad had processed more than $17 billion between January 2025 and June 2026.

It was the second time in just over a year that Washington had gone after A7. Britain, the European Union and the United States had already sanctioned its Russian companies, the Kyrgyz firm that issues its ruble-pegged stablecoin, A7A5, and the exchange where most of that coin traded. A7 kept working anyway. In June, Mr. Shor told Reuters that A7 planned to “operate everywhere.” In August, Pyotr Fradkov, chairman and chief executive of PSB, the state defense bank that co-owns A7, said turnover in A7A5 was nearing $140 billion.

Leaked company files obtained by the Financial Times and by the Open Source Centre, a research group, together with blockchain data from three analytics firms and the U.S. government’s own filings, show why the earlier rounds fell short. The sanctions named companies, and A7 is built on companies it can replace. Most of its money moved through ordinary bank accounts in Hong Kong, the Emirates and Kyrgyzstan, wrapped in forged trade paperwork, not through crypto. Where banks closed accounts and where A7’s main crypto exchange went dark, the flows shrank. The Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, or FinCEN, now wants to cut off every A7 front company at once, and its proposal is open for comment until Nov. 4.

Before A7

In the first weeks of the war in Ukraine, the EU cut several Russian banks off SWIFT, the messaging system banks use for international payments. Roughly 80 percent of Russian banks have been sanctioned since 2022 and many have lost SWIFT access, TRM Labs, a blockchain analytics firm, wrote this month. Russian exporters and importers turned to banks in friendly countries.

On Dec. 22, 2023, President Joe Biden signed Executive Order 14114, which let the Treasury impose secondary sanctions on any foreign bank that conducted a “significant transaction” involving Russia’s military-industrial base, knowingly or not and even without a U.S. connection, according to an analysis by the law firm Morrison Foerster. Banks in third countries became harder to use. By then, El País reported, Russia was feeling the isolation, and the Kremlin’s answer was to back a parallel payments structure of its own.

The man at the top

Over three days in 2014, about $1 billion drained out of three Moldovan banks in loans that were never repaid, a loss equal to 12 percent of the country’s economic output. An investigation for Moldova’s central bank found that the banks had sent at least 13.5 billion lei to five companies tied to a group controlled by Mr. Shor.

A Moldovan court convicted him in 2017. He fled to Israel in 2019 while appealing, and in April 2023 an appeals court in Chisinau doubled his sentence to 15 years, in absentia, and ordered 254 million euros in assets confiscated, Balkan Insight reported. The Treasury had sanctioned him in October 2022, accusing him of working with Moscow-based entities to stir political unrest in Moldova. El País reported that he flew to Russia in 2023 on a private jet owned by Roman Abramovich. He became a Russian citizen in 2024.

His partner was Promsvyazbank, or PSB. The Treasury says Russia nationalized the bank in 2018 and “repurposed it to finance Russia’s defense industry.” Mr. Fradkov, who runs it, is a son of Mikhail Fradkov, a former Russian prime minister and spy chief. In January 2025, the Treasury said Mr. Shor had taken part in talks about using Kyrgyzstan’s Keremet Bank to move money for PSB, and described the bank’s sale to a Kremlin-linked buyer as an effort “to create a sanctions evasion hub for Russia.” A7 was set up in 2024, with Mr. Shor holding 51 percent and PSB 49 percent.

Some of the money went back toward Moldova. Elliptic, a blockchain analytics firm, studied data leaked from Mr. Shor’s businesses in September 2025 and found that wallets linked to A7 had received about $8 billion in stablecoins over 18 months, a figure it called a lower bound. Crypto paid for servers behind Taito, an app that Moldovan police warned in August 2025 was being used for illegal campaign financing and voter bribery.

How the money moves

The working parts are front companies that the U.S. government calls sub-agents. They are registered in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, the Seychelles, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, among other places, and on paper they are local businesses. In practice, according to the Treasury, A7 staff run their websites and bank accounts, logging in through custom-built virtual private networks that hide where the staff are. Britain’s National Crime Agency described the same setup in an Aug. 31 flash alert to banks. By June, according to a FinCEN alert, A7 was operating hundreds of such companies with accounts at about 435 financial institutions in at least 83 countries.

The Financial Times, which reported on Sept. 21 that it had obtained hundreds of thousands of A7’s internal files, counted more than $6.9 billion moved through international banks between late 2024 and August 2025. About $1.1 billion went to accounts at Standard Chartered in Hong Kong, and more than $1.8 billion went out through First Abu Dhabi Bank. Another $273 million was sent to DBS in Hong Kong. Citigroup clients received $74 million and Deutsche Bank clients in Europe about $18 million, according to the FT’s figures.

Paperwork got the payments through. The FT described an “industrial-scale forgery operation.” El País reported that an automated system rewrote invoices, product descriptions and customs codes, so that optical transceivers and motors for drones were billed as LED lights and barber chairs. Some payments, the FT reported, were for sensitive military goods, including purchases by Russian intelligence agencies.

One bank noticed. In February 2025, Standard Chartered flagged payments coming through three Kyrgyz lenders, Eldik, Aiyl and Eurasian Savings Bank, after spotting transfers split into smaller amounts, and the receiving accounts were closed. A7 moved more of its business to banks in the Emirates. First Abu Dhabi Bank told the FT that every A7-linked account it had identified was closed. Standard Chartered, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase and Deutsche Bank said they were committed to anti-money-laundering rules and declined to comment further.

Crypto ran alongside the bank route. The independent Russian outlet Proekt, citing company documents, reported in April that a Russian buyer sends rubles through PSB to A7 in Kyrgyzstan, where intermediaries buy crypto on Grinex, an A7-affiliated exchange, and partner firms in the Middle East and Southeast Asia turn it into local currency to pay the seller. Proekt reported that the F.S.B., Russia’s security service, knows and looks away because the elite uses the same route for luxury imports. Its list of users included Nikolai Patrushev, a former F.S.B. director, and Mr. Abramovich, whose associate told the outlet that he has no connection to A7.

A coin built not to freeze

A7A5 went live in early 2025. Elliptic dates the launch to January, while Mr. Fradkov puts it in February. The token is issued by Old Vector, a Kyrgyz company, and its backers say each one is matched by a ruble on deposit at PSB.

On March 6, 2025, a U.S. Secret Service-led operation took down Garantex, a Moscow-linked crypto exchange that the Treasury had sanctioned in April 2022, and froze more than $26 million in crypto. Garantex’s operators moved customer balances to a successor, Grinex, and let users recover their money in A7A5, the Treasury said in August 2025. The takedown showed how exposed sanctions evaders are when they hold Tether’s USDT, the dollar stablecoin whose issuer can freeze tokens, Elliptic wrote. A7A5’s issuer answers to the sanctioned network. Unlike the dominant stablecoins, El País reported, A7A5 was designed so that it cannot be frozen.

It grew fast. In July 2025, Elliptic posted that the coin was moving $1 billion a day, a notable figure for a token created as part of a Russian sanctions evasion scheme.

Ruble-backed stablecoin A7A5 has seen adoption soar over the past two weeks, and is now used to transfer $1 billion per day. That’s particularly significant when A7A5 was created as part of a Russian sanctions evasion scheme.

In Elliptic’s latest research we dive into the…

Elliptic @elliptic on X · July 28, 2025

Every count since has been large and every count is different. Chainalysis put A7A5’s 2025 volume at $93.3 billion. Elliptic said in January that the coin had passed $100 billion in transfers less than a year after launch. Mr. Fradkov told the Russian outlet RBC in August that turnover was nearing $140 billion. FinCEN said more than 180 entities moved at least $179.1 billion in A7A5 from February 2025 to June 2026.

Those are totals of transfers, not money in circulation. In January, Elliptic counted just over 42.5 billion tokens outstanding, worth about $547 million. TRM, working with the Open Source Centre, found that roughly $35 billion of the coin’s volume appeared to come from circular transfers between A7 and other Russian sanctions-evasion actors, and concluded that the token works more as an internal ledger than as a payment rail. Chris Keegan, a TRM analyst, said activity dropped sharply on weekends, which he read as business transfers tied to Grinex rather than public use. He said in July:

We truly don’t think there is large-scale, authentic usage of A7A5 outside of A7

Chris Keegan, analyst at TRM Labs, coinpaprika.com

Counting the money

Mr. Shor gave his own number to Vladimir Putin. On Sept. 4, 2025, during a videoconference tied to the Russian president’s trip to Vladivostok, where A7 was opening an office, Mr. Shor said the company had handled more than 7.5 trillion rubles in 10 months and was carrying out 1,500 to 2,000 transactions a day, according to IPN, a Moldovan news agency. He said A7 planned to pay about 20 billion rubles in taxes in 2025. Mr. Fradkov joined him on the call.

The Treasury converts A7’s claim to about $91.5 billion, roughly 13 percent of Russia’s foreign trade transactions in 2025. Proekt’s documents put A7’s share of cross-border transfers at about 15 percent. Both figures start from the company’s own accounting.

The government counts are narrower. FinCEN’s $17 billion covers only what the sub-agents it identified processed in 18 months. The FT’s $6.9 billion is what the leaked files show through August 2025, and the paper found another 17,500 payments whose value it could not determine. The blockchain totals mix trade settlement with the network shuffling money among its own wallets. No two of these figures measure the same thing, and the largest, A7’s own, has not been independently verified.

A year of designations

Britain listed A7 on May 20, 2025, and the EU followed in July. On Aug. 14, 2025, the Treasury designated A7, two of its subsidiaries, Old Vector and Grinex, along with Garantex’s operators. John K. Hurley, the Treasury’s under secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, said then that “the United States will not tolerate abuse of this industry to support cybercrime and sanctions evasion.”

Six days later, Britain sanctioned Old Vector, Grinex, a second Kyrgyz exchange called Meer and Kyrgyzstan’s state-owned Capital Bank, which it said Russia used to pay for military goods. The bank said it had stopped dealing with sanctioned clients in 2023. The EU’s 19th package, adopted Oct. 23, 2025, banned any transaction in A7A5 from Nov. 25 and put transaction bans on banks in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In November, Uniswap added A7A5 to the blocklist on its web interface.

This year the targets moved down the chain. The EU’s 20th package, adopted April 23, banned all Russia-based crypto service providers and listed TengriCoin, the operator of Meer. It also used the bloc’s anti-circumvention tool for the first time, restricting exports of machine tools and radio equipment to Kyrgyzstan, where EU goods exports had risen from 263 million euros in 2021 to 2.5 billion euros in 2024. On May 26, Britain added 18 designations aimed at Russia’s financial infrastructure, with the A7 network as a central target. Then came the National Crime Agency’s alert.

The Treasury announced its Oct. 1 action on X as part of Operation Economic Outcast, a campaign the administration aims at Iran.

Today, Treasury took unprecedented action against the A7 Network, a shadow banking network with ties to Russia used by the Iranian regime to evade sanctions as part of Operation Economic Outcast.

Treasury’s @FinCENnews proposed a rule that would prohibit transmittals of funds…

Treasury Department @USTreasury on X · October 1, 2026

The new designation covers the network itself, not a list of named companies. The Treasury said one sub-agent had dealt with Iran’s shadow fleet of oil tankers and, with a sister company, received nearly $140 million from parties involved in evading Iran sanctions, and that another sent about $1.6 million to a company tied to Iranian weapons procurement. TRM found that one A7 address had received more than $65 million directly from an address attributed to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. “Treasury is dismantling the financial infrastructure that allows Iran and other adversaries to evade sanctions,” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said.

Why it kept running

Designations work on names, and A7 produces names. “It’s a company-creating machine,” an industry source told El País. FinCEN’s proposal concedes the point. It found that “the layer of obfuscation provided by Sub-Agents” let A7 get around U.S. sanctions and anti-money-laundering controls, and it would apply to sub-agents as a class, from a list shared privately with banks. TRM wrote that publishing the list would let A7 set up replacement companies faster.

The paperwork held up. A bank processing a payment sees a trading company and an invoice, and the FT’s files show both were built to look ordinary. Standard Chartered caught the pattern in the way transfers were split, not in the documents.

Kyrgyzstan gave the network a door. The Open Source Centre found that A7 reached major currencies and banks through the state-owned Trading Company of the Kyrgyz Republic, “all with top cover from Kyrgyzstan’s senior politicians.” The FT identified that agency, now defunct, as the largest single payer in its files, and Proekt reported that it may have used A7 to pay secretly for Russian gas sent to Turkey after Gazprombank was sanctioned. Kyrgyzstan’s presidential administration has said Capital Bank does not help anyone get around sanctions.

And A7 has a state behind it. Russia’s central bank licensed its companies within months, VEB.RF, the state development corporation, backs it, according to Lawfare, and Mr. Putin joined the opening of its Vladivostok office by video. At the St. Petersburg economic forum in June, where A7 had a stand built around a giant matryoshka doll, Mr. Shor put it this way to Reuters:

we have many sanctions imposed, but nevertheless, we continue to work

Ilan Shor, chief executive and co-owner of A7, aol.com

Mr. Fradkov told RBC that what frightened him was not sanctions but the risk of losing the ability to run the payment mechanism afterward. He described the system as “a distributed network of settlement centres, partner financial institutions, trading and legal structures.”

Western policy also left other doors open. The United States did not sanction Gazprombank until late 2024, and Raiffeisen Bank International’s Russian unit is the country’s largest lender not under sanctions. On Sept. 17, the short seller Grizzly Research, which disclosed a bet against Raiffeisen’s shares, said it had found $1.19 billion in Russian trade involving restricted goods tied to the bank. The shares fell 9 percent. Raiffeisen called the report misleading and factually wrong and said its compliance systems had been audited repeatedly, Meduza reported.

The case that it is faltering

The strongest argument that sanctions are working comes from the analysts who track the coin. Tom Robinson, a co-founder of Elliptic, said in July that A7A5’s monthly volumes had fallen more than 90 percent since January and were 96 percent below their peak, and he tied the slide to the sanctions and the loss of Grinex. Grinex halted on April 16 after what it said was the theft of more than 1 billion rubles, about $13 million, which it blamed on the special services of unfriendly states. That claim could not be independently verified.

The squeeze began earlier. Liquidity that the issuer supplied to A7A5’s own exchange fell from as much as $150 million a day in July 2025 to $0.5 million a week by November, which Elliptic linked to fear that its USDT would be frozen after the U.S. sanctions. From late August 2025, users reported account freezes at major exchanges when deposits traced back to A7A5. The Open Source Centre argued that A7’s reliance on the system it was built to avoid leaves it “still inherently vulnerable to disruption.” Elise Thomas, an analyst at the Centre for Information Resilience, wrote in Lawfare that A7 depends on the trust of legitimate clients, who may ask whether a man convicted over a billion-dollar bank theft should be holding their money.

A7’s people dispute the decline. Oleg Ogienko, A7A5’s director for regulatory affairs, told CoinDesk in May that the coin had “a good chance to stay competitive even after the sanctions are lifted,” CoinDesk reported. In July he called the analysts’ metrics outdated, saying most activity happens on decentralized platforms they miss. The project said it processed $34.4 billion from Jan. 1 to June 17.

A Russian stablecoin built to dodge sanctions says it can survive even if they're lifted
A video report carrying the headline of CoinDesk’s May 24 article on A7A5’s argument that it can outlast Western sanctions. Video: Crypto World Daily · YouTube

Weighed against the record, the analysts are right about the coin. Its exchange is gone, its liquidity has dried up and its headline volume is padded with circular transfers. But the Open Source Centre’s main finding is that crypto was never A7’s main channel, and the bank route shows no comparable collapse. FinCEN’s $17 billion runs through June, more than a year after the first British, EU and U.S. designations. Mr. Fradkov said in August that A7 had 15,000 regular customers and handled up to 2,000 payments a day, and A7 has opened offices in Nigeria and Zimbabwe, according to Lawfare. The sanctions cost A7 its crypto plumbing. They have not, on the evidence so far, cost it its bank accounts.

What comes next

FinCEN’s proposal was published in the Federal Register on Monday. Under a section of the Combating Russian Money Laundering Act, it would bar covered U.S. financial institutions, 347,926 by FinCEN’s estimate, from sending or receiving funds, in dollars or crypto, in any transaction involving A7’s sub-agents. FinCEN chose a ban on transmittals over narrower limits on correspondent accounts because A7A5 transfers never pass through correspondent banks. Listed companies could petition to be removed.

The Iran framing is new. Maria Shagina, a sanctions researcher at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, told RFE/RL:

It’s quite telling that the US is designating a major evasion network born and bred from Russia via the Iran connection

Maria Shagina, International Institute for Strategic Studies, rferl.org

She said that going after A7’s wider web of intermediaries could disrupt financial links in third countries, and U.S. officials framed the rule as a warning to banks in China, the Emirates and Kazakhstan, RFE/RL reported. A7 said in a statement on Oct. 2 that the Iran accusations were “a blatant lie and slander,” that it handles “legitimate import and export operations involving consumer goods and commodities,” and that “Sanctions against us are precisely recognition of this efficiency.”

Mr. Shor remains in Russia, under a 15-year Moldovan sentence he has never served. Comments on FinCEN’s rule, docket FINCEN-2026-0265, are due Nov. 4.