---
title: "Sudan’s pound hits 12,000 to the dollar. That, not diplomacy, may force a ceasefire"
description: "Currency collapse, Kordofan gains and a looming hunger peak are doing what three years of sanctions have not"
author: "Luis Goa"
published: 2026-11-21T06:32:04Z
modified: 2026-11-21T12:28:41Z
url: https://rews.cc/a/sudan-s-pound-hits-12-000-to-the-dollar-that-not-diplomacy-m-b318af
language: en
tags: ["war", "economy", "humanitarian", "politics", "world"]
publisher: "Rews (https://rews.cc)"
---

# Sudan’s pound hits 12,000 to the dollar. That, not diplomacy, may force a ceasefire

*Currency collapse, Kordofan gains and a looming hunger peak are doing what three years of sanctions have not*

By Luis Goa · November 21, 2026 · https://rews.cc/a/sudan-s-pound-hits-12-000-to-the-dollar-that-not-diplomacy-m-b318af

## In brief

- Sudan’s pound hit about 12,000 to the dollar by 19 November 2026, a 20-fold fall from its roughly 600 pre-war rate
- Atbara, birthplace of the 2018 protests that toppled Bashir, saw fare protests again on 25 October 2026 over fuel shortages
- Army retook el-Khuwei in West Kordofan on 13 November; RSF still holds 85-90% of that state and nearly all of Darfur
- UN mission found genocide occurred in RSF-held el-Fasher; UN says 41% of Sudanese faced acute food insecurity in early 2026
- UN’s DiCarlo told the Security Council the warring parties show “no credible commitment” to a negotiated pause

The number to watch in Sudan’s war is not a casualty count or a UN resolution. It’s the exchange rate. The Sudanese pound traded at about 600 to the US dollar before the war started in April 2023. By September 2026 it had fallen past 7,300 on Khartoum’s parallel market. By 21 October it hit 10,105. By 16 November it was near 11,000, and by 19 November dealers quoted it at roughly 12,000, a rise of about 9 percent in three days, according to Sudan Tribune’s reporting from Khartoum dealers. That’s a 20-fold depreciation against the dollar since the war began, most of it compressed into the last two months.

A collapsing currency is the mechanism, not just the symptom, of how Sudan’s war economy breaks down. The army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have both financed their fighting by printing money, taxing trade routes and selling captured resources, which is why Khartoum’s central bank has no reserves to defend the pound and why the gap between its official rate and the street rate keeps widening. Writing in [Al Jazeera](https://aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/11/21/sudans-war-will-end-but-will-it-be-too-late), the analyst Cameron Hudson, back from a visit to Khartoum this month, argues that this currency arithmetic, not international diplomacy, is what’s pushing both sides toward a ceasefire.

## What the street is already doing

The clearest evidence is in Atbara, the River Nile State town where protests over bread prices in December 2018 started the uprising that eventually toppled President Omar al-Bashir. On 25 October 2026, residents there blocked roads and burned tyres after transport fares between Atbara and Ed Damer jumped to 7,000 pounds a passenger, a spike Sudan Tribune tied to fuel depots and petrol stations running dry. The fuel shortage is a dollar shortage as much as an oil shortage: importers need hard currency to buy fuel, and at 12,000 pounds to the dollar there isn’t enough of it to go around. Hudson reports petrol queues stretching for blocks in Khartoum even for those who can afford to fill a tank, and farmers skipping fertiliser because they can’t afford it either, which means this year’s shortfall compounds into next year’s.

![A long line of cars stretches toward the horizon beside a red gas pump with its nozzle lying on the ground.](https://rews.cc/img/1253221b00e6a344466e57519e96c947ad61e20f.webp)

## The battlefield numbers are less tidy than they look

Hudson credits army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s recent gains with adding to the pressure: the army and allied Joint Forces took the West Kordofan town of el-Khuwei on 13 November after a six-day offensive, part of a push that, per Hudson, has brought army control to “roughly two-thirds of the country.” That figure is higher than most trackers show. Wikipedia’s running tally of the war puts army-held territory at about 60 percent, and even after el-Khuwei, the RSF controls an estimated 85 to 90 percent of West Kordofan state, according to territorial-control mapping from Sudans Post, with government forces holding only a northeastern sliver. Darfur, the RSF’s core territory, remains almost entirely outside army reach, separated from the Kordofan front by RSF-held towns like al-Nahud. Al-Burhan has promised to retake “every inch” of the country from the RSF on multiple occasions since 2023, most recently in October, while rejecting ceasefire talks, which cuts against the idea that battlefield math alone is softening his position.

What gives the Kordofan front its weight is what happened after the RSF took el-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, in October 2025. A UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission interviewed 320 witnesses and, in February 2026, found that mass killings, systematic rape and the deliberate starvation of a besieged population bore the “hallmarks of genocide”; by July 2026 the mission went further and concluded, as [Al Jazeera reported](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/9/un-probe-finds-mass-killings-gang-rapes-by-sudans-rsf-amount-to-genocide), that genocide had in fact occurred, targeting the Zaghawa and Fur communities. The UN has said 6,000 people were killed in the three days after el-Fasher fell; British MPs were briefed that the toll across the siege may exceed 60,000, with some 150,000 residents still unaccounted for, according to the [UN mission’s findings](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/02/sudan-evidence-el-fasher-reveals-genocidal-campaign-targeting-non-arab). The mission’s chair has since warned that el-Obeid, a city now ringed by RSF forces, faces the same trajectory. Any army push into Darfur carries that record as both a reason to go and a warning of the cost.

![A decorated bowl is held in a large bench vise against a yellow background.](https://rews.cc/img/c19b248a2c733a5f3ba63fca7e701a1e652d27c2.webp)

## A hunger clock running on a schedule, not a negotiation

The clearest, least contestable pressure is the food math. The UN’s Integrated Food Security Phase Classification found that nearly 19.5 million people, about 41 percent of Sudan’s population, faced IPC Phase 3 (crisis) acute food insecurity or worse between February and May 2026, including roughly 135,000 people in Phase 5 (catastrophe), according to the [IPC’s special report](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Sudan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Feb2026_Jan2027_Special_Report.pdf). Humanitarian agencies reached only 3.1 million of the 3.9 million people targeted for food assistance in January 2026, about 16 percent of everyone in Phase 3 or above. On top of that, a Super El Niño event, forecast by the World Meteorological Organization to run strong through early 2027, has cut June–September 2026 rainfall in parts of northern Sudan to less than half the normal total, degrading the harvest that was supposed to carry the country through the next lean season. The World Food Programme projects, as reported by the [Daily Sabah](https://www.dailysabah.com/world/africa/war-ravaged-sudan-on-brink-as-el-nino-fans-new-flames-of-hunger/amp), that drought alone will push 350,000 more people into severe hunger by the end of 2026, rising to 1.2 million more by August 2027. FEWS NET’s analysis puts the worst of the combined conflict-and-drought effect between March and August 2027, the same window Hudson cites in warning that Sudan’s hunger crisis could become catastrophic by mid-2027 absent a ceasefire that lets aid in at scale. That timeline is a projection, not a measurement, built on rainfall data and conflict-access assumptions that could change if either side opens or closes a corridor.

**Where the pressure for a ceasefire is coming from** Three internal channels running ahead of diplomacy, per Cameron Hudson's account

| From | To | How |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Pound collapse, fuel shortage | Atbara fare protests |  |
| Atbara fare protests | Internal ceasefire pressure |  |
| Army gains in Kordofan | Internal ceasefire pressure | leverage |
| RSF holds Darfur, el-Fasher findings | Internal ceasefire pressure | urgency |
| 41% face acute hunger, El Niño | Internal ceasefire pressure |  |
| US sanctions on both sides | UN: no credible move to dialogue | so far |

![Where the pressure for a ceasefire is coming from. Three internal channels running ahead of diplomacy, per Cameron Hudson's account](https://rews.cc/img/dc75ce957195541ff32a514d008193f2f78def39.webp)

Based on [Cameron Hudson, Al Jazeera](https://aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/11/21/sudans-war-will-end-but-will-it-be-too-late)

## Why sanctions aren’t the mechanism doing the work

The US Treasury’s approach has been to keep adding names to its sanctions list: al-Burhan himself in January 2025, three RSF commanders over the el-Fasher siege in February 2026, a Colombian-mercenary recruitment network in April, and eight more individuals and entities in June, with Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent framing the June round as protecting prospects for a humanitarian truce. Analysts reviewing the campaign, writing on the Horn Review, note that the test isn’t whether Washington can impose costs but whether those costs close the gap between a temporary truce and an actual political settlement, and conclude that as of September 2026 the evidence doesn’t yet answer that. At the Security Council this month, UN Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo gave the bleaker reading directly, according to her [remarks as delivered](https://dppa.un.org/en/speeches-and-statements/remarks-by-usg-dicarlo-to-the-security-council-on-sudan-as-delivered), saying both sides “seem to believe that they can make greater gains on the battlefield.” That assessment and Hudson’s aren’t actually contradictory: DiCarlo is describing the negotiating table, where nothing has moved; Hudson is describing the street, the barracks and the currency desk, where something is. The gap between the two is the gap between what diplomacy can see and what it can move. An American push to broker a separate deal insulating oil infrastructure from the fighting [collapsed earlier this autumn](https://rews.cc/a/in-doha-an-american-envoy-buries-the-oil-for-protection-barg-0900d1), which is one more data point for the DiCarlo reading.

> The picture is bleak. … The parties continue to show no credible commitment to compromise or to pursuing a negotiated pause in fighting. They are not moving closer to dialogue.

The war’s cost keeps showing up in places that don’t make it into ceasefire math: Sudanese with chronic illness are [reportedly cutting medicine to buy food](https://rews.cc/a/in-sudan-s-war-the-chronically-ill-must-choose-between-food--b9030d), and drone strikes between Khartoum and Kordofan have [killed more than 160 people in four-day spans](https://rews.cc/a/from-khartoum-to-kordofan-sudan-s-drones-kill-more-than-160--9680a7). None of that moves al-Burhan or RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo on its own. What might, on Hudson’s account, is a currency that keeps falling on a schedule no general controls. The number to watch next isn’t a ceasefire announcement. It’s whether the pound stabilises anywhere above 12,000, or whether Khartoum’s central bank, which let commercial banks set their own rates this year and still produced no fix at its 18 November meeting, has simply run out of tools.

## See also

- [Territorial Control Map, Sudan conflict, 17 November 2026](https://www.sudanspost.com/territorial-control-map-sudan-conflict-as-of-november-17-2026/) — sudanspost.com · Maps army and RSF holdings used to check the "two-thirds" claim
- [The United States' Shifting Sudan Strategy and the Limits of Coercive Leverage](https://hornreview.org/2026/09/25/the-united-states-shifting-sudan-strategy-and-the-limits-of-coercive-leverage/) — hornreview.org · Analysis of whether US sanctions are changing either side's calculus
