Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have signed agreements, created a monitoring mechanism and held repeated meetings. The remaining difficulty is awkwardly basic: they do not agree on how to tell whether either side has done what it promised. Another round of talks is reportedly expected in Geneva on November 19, although Al Jazeera says it could not independently confirm the gathering reported by Africa Intelligence.

The Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity were signed on December 4, 2025, building on a June 27 peace agreement and an April 25 Declaration of Principles. Their commitments include neutralising the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, or FDLR; Rwanda’s disengagement and lifting of defensive measures; respect for territorial integrity; and an end to support for armed groups. The first two commitments have become the immediate test, with each government presenting its own actions as movement and the other side’s as insufficient.

Oversight belongs to the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism, which brings together the DRC, Rwanda, the United States, Qatar, African Union mediator Togo and the AU Commission. It coordinates security measures, including efforts to locate the FDLR. Meetings in July, August and September 2026 addressed conditions in eastern DRC, information-sharing, monitoring, verification, and FDLR disarmament and demobilisation. Procedures improved; the central disagreement did not. The parties still lack a shared standard for deciding when their security obligations have been fulfilled.

Two hands hold tape measures across a gap, with nuclear plants above and a magnifying glass on a sheet of paper below.

Rwanda says it has started. Permanent Representative Martin Ngoga told the UN Security Council on September 29 that Kigali had begun lifting its defensive measures. He also said the FDLR remained active in eastern DRC and continued cooperating with Congolese forces and other armed groups. Ending that alleged cooperation is, in Rwanda’s account, necessary for implementation. Kigali therefore links further movement to a threat that it says Kinshasa has not eliminated.

Kinshasa points to a July 28 protocol with one faction of the FDLR’s armed wing, establishing arrangements for disarmament and demobilisation. Government spokesman Patrick Muyaya told Al Jazeera that this formed part of Congo’s Washington commitments. Rwanda rejected it. Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe called the arrangement a “crude manipulation”, while Ngoga argued that an agreement with one faction could not satisfy the broader obligation to neutralise the group.

That dispute is more than an argument over diplomatic wording. If disarming a faction counts as progress, Congo can demonstrate implementation while wider FDLR operations remain contested. If neutralisation requires dismantling the group’s broader operational capacity, Rwanda can regard the same protocol as inadequate. Without agreed measures and verification, each government can claim to be honouring the accord while questioning the other’s compliance.

Washington has added sanctions to the negotiating machinery. On October 28, the United States sanctioned Rwanda’s Ministry of Defence and Zigama Credit and Savings Society over alleged support for the M23 armed group. Washington accused the ministry of directing Rwandan forces operating alongside M23 and supplying military equipment and other assistance; it alleged that Zigama facilitated financial and logistical support for Rwandan military activities. The US Treasury said the measures were intended to hold Rwanda accountable under the accords.

A large clamp squeezes military equipment, while a chain connected to it breaks across two torn pieces of paper.

Kigali rejected those allegations. Government spokesperson Yolande Makolo said commitments concerning the FDLR remained unfulfilled and called for all parties to be held accountable. The result is a sanctions-backed process in which the sponsoring power has accused one signatory of supporting an armed group, while that signatory says the other side’s armed-group obligations remain outstanding.

M23 also has a separate negotiating track. Talks involving Kinshasa, M23 and its ally, the Congo River Alliance, are facilitated by Qatar through the Doha process. That process produced a Declaration of Principles in July 2025 and a framework covering ceasefire monitoring, humanitarian access, security arrangements, disarmament and restoration of state authority. The June 2025 agreement recognises that settling eastern Congo’s conflict requires addressing non-state armed groups as well as commitments between governments.

The identity of the negotiating party then changed. On October 12, 2026, the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation was established and presented as replacing the AFC/M23 political-military structure. Its founding declaration dissolved the AFC and assumed its rights and obligations, including Doha commitments. M23’s leadership was incorporated into the new structure, but the declaration did not explicitly set out the armed movement’s separate organisational status. That leaves practical questions about representation and responsibility for implementation.

Six chairs surround a round conference table, with one chair split between black leather and red wood in a textured collage.

There is also an economic ledger. Alongside the peace agreement, Washington and Kinshasa signed a strategic partnership on December 4, 2025 covering mining, critical minerals and infrastructure. It reflects US interest in Congolese copper and cobalt and in diversifying supply chains. After a November 6 steering committee meeting in Paris, the governments reported growing interest from American companies. Kinshasa says the partnership should be judged by tangible investment rather than announcements.

The diplomatic architecture rests on older, largely unsuccessful attempts to resolve the same security problem. The 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement addressed foreign forces and armed groups after the Second Congo War. The FDLR, founded in 2000, emerged from elements of the former Rwandan armed forces and Interahamwe militia who fled to Congo after the 1994 genocide against Tutsi in Rwanda. The 2002 Pretoria Agreement, 2007 Nairobi Communique and 2013 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework renewed commitments on withdrawal, disarmament and territorial integrity.

The next meeting therefore has a narrower task than the title of the accords suggests. Kigali and Kinshasa need verifiable steps, a common definition of completion and a way to resolve disputes over evidence. Until then, diplomatic progress can accumulate in meeting records while the obligations meant to change conditions on the ground remain differently understood by the people who signed them.