Here is a small business model. You used to run a spy agency, which means you know a lot of secrets, and secrets are valuable. You are retired now, so the secrets are no longer flowing to you through official channels. But you still have a friend on the inside — your old chief of staff, who stayed on after you left and kept the job under several of your successors. Your friend has access to roughly all the secrets. Your friend could, in theory, just email you some. And you could, in theory, use them in your private consulting work, where clients pay you handsome fees for insights that are, hmm, remarkably well-informed. The only real wrinkle is that this is, quite seriously, treason.
On Tuesday, German federal prosecutors arrested August Hanning, 80, who was president of the Bundesnachrichtendienst — the BND, Germany’s foreign intelligence service — from 1998 to 2005, on suspicion of ‘treasonous espionage, spying out state secrets, attempted treason, and espionage,’ as Euronews reported. He was picked up in Bad Tölz-Wolfratshausen, in southern Germany. His former chief of staff, identified under German privacy rules only as Manfred D, was arrested the same day in Steinfurt, in western Germany, on suspicion of aiding and abetting attempted treason and treasonous espionage. Premises belonging to both men were searched late Tuesday, in several locations including Berlin.
The mechanism, as the Office of the Federal Public Prosecutor General laid it out, is pleasingly simple. Manfred D was Hanning’s chief of staff, then stayed on as chief of staff for Hanning’s successors from 2012 until 2026 — a man with a front-row seat to the BND’s confidential paperwork for well over a decade, spanning multiple administrations. According to the prosecutors, as Al Jazeera reported, the two men agreed in 2010 that Manfred D would continuously pass valuable BND intelligence to Hanning ‘in exchange for remuneration.’ Hanning would then put the material to use in his private consulting work, and — in at least one instance, prosecutors say — use classified documents supplied by Manfred D to draft an analysis for an officer of a foreign intelligence service. ‘In another instance,’ spokesperson Ines Peterson told German media, ‘he is alleged to have passed on information following an extensive exchange — also with an employee of another intelligence service.’
The scale, per the prosecutors’ statement: ‘approximately 2,000 documents’ over the years, ‘many of which contained classified information to be used exclusively by the federal intelligence service for internal purposes, particularly for executive intelligence briefings.’ Which is to say: the stuff written for the eyes of the people who run Germany. Manfred D allegedly kept the pipeline running until June 2022. Two thousand documents is not a lapse in judgment over a long lunch. Two thousand documents is a supply chain.
Which foreign service, you ask? The prosecutors aren’t saying: the statement names neither the country nor the agency, and allows only that ‘it has yet to be determined if the material reached the intended recipient’ — a sentence that manages to be both alarming and faintly comic. There may have been a treasonous espionage operation with a deliverability problem.
How they got caught
And here is the part where the story, already remarkable, becomes genuinely strange. The treason investigation did not begin with counterintelligence work, a mole hunt or a defector. It began with a steakhouse. Hanning had come under scrutiny in a separate investigation into the January 2024 abduction in Denmark of the children of Christina Block, a Hamburg businesswoman and heiress to the Block House steakhouse chain, amid a lengthy custody battle with her ex-husband. Searches of Hanning’s residence in connection with that case turned up the evidence behind Tuesday’s arrests, the prosecutor’s office said. Per German news agency dpa, prosecutors had announced in the fall of 2025 that Hanning and a retired official of the Hamburg State Criminal Police Office were suspected of having accepted a contract from Block in 2022 to abduct her children, while serving as executives of a security firm. The custody trial has been tabloid catnip in Germany; Block House is a prominent national chain, and the Blocks are a prominent Hamburg family.
So, to recap the alleged career arc: run the country’s foreign intelligence service for seven years; retire; become a security-company executive; allegedly accept a contract to kidnap a steakhouse heiress’s children in Denmark; get your house searched over it; get arrested for treason because of what the search found. I think the interesting question is what the consulting clients were actually paying for, and whether any of them are now rereading their engagement letters.
The political reaction has been about what you’d expect, plus one useful policy proposal. Marc Henrichmann, the MP who chairs the German parliament’s intelligence oversight committee, told AFP that Germany ‘will not tolerate the betrayal of secrets’ and that ‘whoever allies themselves with the enemies of our liberal democracy will be found out.’ Konstantin von Notz, a Green on the same committee, called it ‘a hard-hitting and deeply troubling story,’ demanded ‘a swift and thorough investigation into the egregious allegations levelled against former BND chief Hanning,’ and called on the state to bar former top intelligence executives and anyone holding a high-level security clearance from doing private consulting work after leaving office — which he described, reasonably, as a matter of national security.
That last suggestion cuts to the actual economics. The revolving door between spying and consulting exists because the knowledge is monetisable; Hanning’s alleged innovation was simply to keep the raw material flowing after the actuarial value of his Rolodex should have expired, wholesale rather than retail. You can fill a room with people explaining why former spy chiefs deserve to earn in the private sector. It is harder to explain why the private sector will pay — unless the secrets are the point.

