---
title: "Four decrees and a very large army"
description: "Vladimir Putin expands Russia’s authorised forces for the fourth time this year—by decree, if not yet by mobilisation"
author: "Albion Grey"
published: 2026-09-29T07:15:44Z
modified: 2026-09-29T14:39:04Z
url: https://rews.cc/a/four-decrees-and-a-very-large-army-aadd22
language: en
tags: ["politics", "war", "ukraine", "russia", "military", "world"]
publisher: "Rews (https://rews.cc)"
---

# Four decrees and a very large army

*Vladimir Putin expands Russia’s authorised forces for the fourth time this year—by decree, if not yet by mobilisation*

By Albion Grey · September 29, 2026 · https://rews.cc/a/four-decrees-and-a-very-large-army-aadd22

## In brief

- Vladimir Putin set the armed forces’ authorised strength at 2,441,630, including 1,550,500 military personnel
- The decree adds 15,500 troops and is the fourth expansion this year, totalling 47,860 since March
- Ukrainian intelligence says Russia plans to call up up to 300,000 people this year and the same again next year
- The Kremlin denies a new mobilisation is coming, though analysts say contract recruitment continues to shrink
- Zelenskyy says North Korea is preparing to send 10,000 more soldiers to Russia, beyond 8,000 already deployed

Armies can be enlarged in two ways: by finding more soldiers, or by signing papers. Vladimir Putin is doing the second. On September 29th the Russian president signed a decree setting the authorised strength of the armed forces at 2,441,630 people, including 1,550,500 military personnel—an increase of 15,500 troops, and the fourth such order this year. It follows earlier decrees in March, June and July; the combined increase since March amounts to 47,860 soldiers, according to Euronews.

Mr Putin gave no reason for the expansion. The backdrop, however, is well documented: mounting losses in the full-scale war against Ukraine. Russian advances have slowed this year as the widespread use of drones has made the rapid movement of large troop formations nearly impossible, and in recent weeks Ukrainian forces have reportedly broken through on parts of the front. Authorised strength, it should be said, is a ceiling rather than a headcount; a decree does not itself put a single extra man in uniform. But ceilings are not raised for no reason.

The question hanging over the decree is whether it foreshadows another mobilisation. The last—and only—“partial mobilisation” of reservists was declared in September 2022, after a series of battlefield setbacks; that decree remains in force. In August, Ukraine’s intelligence services reported that Moscow plans to call up as many as 300,000 people this year for the front, and the same again next year. Analysts citing evidence of Russian preparations on the ground have predicted a new wave of mobilisation as soon as this autumn, once elections to the State Duma are safely out of the way—a prospect that has revived ordinary Russians’ fears of conscription and, Euronews reports, a surge of interest in emigration.

The Kremlin denies it all. Mr Putin has dismissed such rumours as “utter nonsense”, insisting that contract soldiers and volunteers are meeting the army’s needs. Independent analysts note, however, that recruitment under contract continues to shrink despite the promise of large financial rewards. The gap between paper strength and actual enlistment is precisely what a decree cannot fix—and what a mobilisation, unpopular and economically draining, would be meant to. The war’s costs are already [reaching Russians’ wallets](https://rews.cc/a/moscow-raises-taxes-for-the-war-days-after-denying-it-would-cd645b) through new taxes.

> In essence, Russia has already begun additional mobilisation, it is expanding the scale of recruitment to its ranks, using various methods for this.

That was Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s president, commenting on the decree in a video address published on X. He added that Russia plans to recruit more foreigners and urged the governments of countries whose citizens are being enlisted to intervene. Mr Zelenskyy also said he had new intelligence indicating that North Korea is preparing to send a further 10,000 soldiers to Russia, on top of the 8,000 already deployed there. Ukraine, which has its own well-reported manpower strains, is hardly a neutral narrator of Russian recruitment; but Pyongyang’s troops in Russia are no longer rumour but established practice.

Four expansions in seven months tell their own story. A confident army does not repeatedly revise its authorised strength upwards; a strained one does, especially when recruitment lags and the front is being held rather than advanced. Whether Mr Putin reaches for the far costlier tool of another mobilisation will be decided less by the arithmetic of decrees than by how much longer volunteers, mercenaries and Koreans can fill the gap.